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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
~IASTIC TILE DIVISION of the 
RUBBEROID COMPANY, a corpo-
ration, 
Plaintiff-Re,spondent 
-vs.-
A C ME DIS'TRIBU·TING COM-
PANY, a corporation, W. N. BEES-
LEY, SR. ·and SCOTT L. BEESL,EY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
9957 
STATEMENT OF T·HE KIND OF CASE 
This case involves two basic causes of action in 
contract: first, a manufacturers .action on a promissory 
note, chattel mortgage and open account against the de-
fendant dis·tributor, a Utah corporation; second, the 
manufacturers action against W. N. Beesley, Sr. and 
Scott L. Beesley personally on an assignment. 
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DISPOSI'TION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment against the individual and corporate 
defendants. All defendants appeal from the judgment 
and the amended judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
All defendants seek reversal of the judgment and 
amended judgment and judgment in favor of the defend-
ants on the assignment and note as a matter of law, or 
that failing, a t.rial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are very intricate and involved 
and at best require a careful examination of ·all the in-
struments as well as the pleadings. 
The plaintiff, Mastic Tile, is a manufaCJturer of tile 
and various other products which are sold t·o distributors 
for local sale. The defendant, Acme Distributing Com-
pany, did purchase from the plaintiff a number of its 
products for sale in Utah. During the several years 
immediately preceding March 10, 1961, the plaintiff sold 
goods on open ·account to Acme Distributing Company. 
By March 10, 1961, the said defendant corporation owed 
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' r 
~ 
to the plaintiff $81,278.91 on open account. At this point 
the plain tiff insisted that the defendant corporation re-
duce the obligation on the open account to a promissory 
note. An agreement was executed on March 10, 1961 
wht-reby the open account in the sum of $81,278.91 was 
redtH'<'d to a promissory note secured by a chattel mort-
gage on all the merchandise to be sold to Acme by the 
plaintiff as well as merchandise then in the inventory 
of Acme. Secondly, the note was. secured by an assign-
ment of all accounts receivable, both present and future, 
which represented sales of the plaintiff's products. 
It is important to note that the· entire indebtedness 
of any ·type or nature which was. due from the defendant, 
Acme Corporation, to the plaintiff was reduced to and 
embodied in the March 10 promissory note and agree-
ment and that no other obligation was due to the plain-
tiff from the defendant at that time. The agreement fur-
ther provided th·at the defendant corporation would p:ay 
the sum of $2,000 per month at 3% per annum. The 
agreement then provided that the plaintiff would allow 
the defendant to purchase on a limited open account 
basis by providing that the open account must be paid 
within 75 days from the invoice date. A 2% discount 
\\·as granted if paid within 60 days. It was the intent 
of the parties to liquidate the note as rapidly as possible 
and to prevent further indebtedness. 
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On March 10, 1961 a suppJemental agreement (said 
agreement was not included in the pleadings before the 
court when the surrunary judgment was granted) was 
executed. This s11pplemental agreement provided in 
paragraph 2 that if the note and the ·open account are 
current, moneys collected on the assigned accounts re-
ceivable may be used in the ordinary course of business. 
It further S'tated that payments received shall first he 
·applied to the oldest item or charge on the account. The 
oldest item or charge on the account is represented by 
the promissory note. The intent of the agreement and 
supplemental agreement was clear. The open account 
was to be kept current and all proceeds received from 
the sale of plaintiff's products were to be applied 
against the note in order to liquidate that obligation as 
quickly as possible. 
At this point in order to fully understand the case 
it must be unders:tood that Acme Distributing Company 
was a Utah corporation engaged in the business of sell-
ing wholesale, various products. Prior to January, 19·61, 
the primary stockho1der was W. N. Beesley, Jr., who 
sold his stock interest in the corporation to his father, 
W. N. Beesley, Sr. and his brother Scott L. Beesley. 
At the time of the sale W. N. Beesley, Jr. owed Acme 
Distributing Company $21,979.73 for advances and loans. 
W. N. Beesley, Sr. and Scott L. Beesley agreed to assume 
this obliga:tion. On March 10, 1961, at the same time the 
agreement, supplemental agreement, note and chattel 
. .. 
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mortgage were executed, an assign1nent of $21,979.73 
claim of Acme distributing Company against W. N. 
Beesley, Jr. was made to ,the plaintiff corporation. The 
plaintiff insisted that W. N. Beesley, Sr. and S.cot.t L. 
Beesley acknowledge and consent personally to the 
assignment. The assignment provides: 
"This assignment shall be a part of that 
certain agreement between them dated March 10, 
1961." 
This assignment has become the basic point of con-
tention between the plaintiff and the defendant in this 
litigation. The defendants all contend that no considera-
tion was given for this assignment and that the purpose 
and intent of the assignment was to secure the $81,278.91 
note and upon payment of the note the security would 
he discharged. The plaintiff's pleadings do not indicate 
what consideration, if any, was paid nor are there any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law to indicate upon 
what theory the court granted the summary judgment. 
On December 20, 1961, there was an extension and 
modification agreement wherein it was agreed that the 
original note of $81,278.91 had been reduced to $55,500\00, 
that the interest rate would be reduced from 3% to 2% 
per annum and that the monthly payments would be re-
duced from $2,000 per month. to $750 per month. It was 
further agreed in paragraph 4 that the sales rebates 
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which had originally been credited against the promis-
S!Ory note would hereafter he credited against the open 
account in order to reduce the open account which was 
becoming quite large. 
During the course of business from March 10, 1961 
to and including approximately December 1, 1962, the 
promissory note obligation was reduced to $47,250.00. 
However, the open account had increased from 0 dollars 
to approximately $35,020.49. The defendant corpora-
tion was in default. In order to avoid an immediate fore-
closure by the plaintiff corporation on all of the ac-
counts receivable and the inventory, the pJaintiff and the 
defendant corporation mutually agreed to have the in-
ventory returned to the plaintiff corporation for full 
credit less freight expense and to cooperate in the collec-
tion of the assigned accounts receivable for the benefit 
of the plaintiff corporation. The plaintiff corporation, 
upon accepting the inventory, gave credit to the defend-
ant corporation of $20,487.40. The plaintiff corporation 
further gave defendant corporation $19,668.27 credit on 
accounts receivable. There was appro:ximately $7,353.54 
in uncollected accounts receivable. Plaintiff also gave 
to the defendant corporation $782.11 credit for sales re-
bate. The total credit was $40,937.78. The plaintiff also 
received the $7,353.54 in assigned accounts receivable 
not yet collected making a grand total of $48,291.32 
either on hand in the form of uncollected accounts re-
ceivable or fully granted credit given by the plaintiff 
to the defendant. 
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The plaintiff then made its motion to the court for 
a swnmary judgment. The court, upon examining the 
documents and hearing arguments by counsel, granted 
a ~ummary judgment against W. N. Beesley, S.r . .and 
Scott L. Beesley personally in the sum of $21,979.73 on 
the basis of the assignment and $19,005.73 ·together with 
interest in the amount of $960.00 and attorney's fees in 
the sum of $4,500.00. The judgment made no distinction 
between the amount owing on the note and the .amount 
owing on the open account. 
Apparently the court granted the judgment in ac-
cordance with the afftdavit supporting the plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment. The said affidavit set up 
the accounting between the parties and prorated the 
inventory between the note and the open account and 
applied all of the accounts receivable to the note. If 
such were the case, the defendant contends that it was 
improper in that both the inventory, chattel, and .assigned 
receivable secured the note, and that by proper applica-
tion of the collected funds and merchandise the note 
would have been discharged or nearly so, and that by 
prorating the inventory between the cpen account and 
the no4-e, the proper payment of the note was avoided.. 
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment although the defendant did file through 
their attorney a counter-affidavit and a motion by the 
defendant that the summary judgment be granted in 
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favor of the defendants, W. N. Beesley, Sr. and Seott 
L. Beesley for no cause of action on the theory that the 
assignment executed by Acme Distributing Company and 
the defendants personally was ·only as security ·and that 
upon payment of the note there was no further need for 
the assignment. The Court denied this motion. Subse-
quent to this denial hy the Court, the defendants did file 
a motion to reconsider the court's action which was also 
denied except that the amended judgment was ordered 
by the court providing that as the uncollected accounts 
receivable were collected, the sum should .apply against 
the judgment. From these rulings of the court all of the 
defendants filed notice of appeal. 
STATE·MEN'T OF POIN'TS 
POINT I. 
THA'T THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT THE COURT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRONEOUSLY CONS'TRUED 
THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS BY PRORATING INVENTORY 
IT'EMS BE:T·WEEN THE OPEN .&C'COUNT AND THE 
NOTE AND BY GRANTING A JUDGMENT WHICH MADE 
NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NOTE AND THE OPEN 
ACCOUNT. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRED IN NOT 
FINDING THAT AT THE TIME THE ASSIGNMENT WAS 
EXECUTED, MARCH 10, 1961, IT WAS FOR SECURITY 
PURPOSES ONLY. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRED IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DE-
FENDANTS, W. N. BEESLEY, SR. AND SCO'T'T L. BEES-
LEY, BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS CLEARLY ESTABLISH 
THAT BY PROPER APPLICATION OF MONEYS RECEIVED, 
THE NOTE SECURED BY THE PERSONAL ASSIGNMENT 
WAS LIQUIDATED THEREBY RELIEVING PERSONAL 
DEFENDANTS OF FURTHER LIABILITY, SINCE THE 
ASSIGNMENT WAS MADE AS SECURITY FOR THE DEBT 
WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE ASSIGNMENT 
AND NOT FOR FUTURE DEBTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAIN-
TIFF'S l\IOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT. 
The undisputed law in this jurisdietion as well as 
other jurisdictions is that sununary judgments will be 
granted only when there are no material issues of law 
or fact in dispute. Therefore the court should not grant 
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summary judgments where there are meritorious daims 
and defenses. In the case of Kidman v. White v. Jones, 
third party plaintiff, v. Wade, third ptarty defendant, 
3'78 Pac 2d 898 p. 900, the Court said : 
"In confronting the problem presented on 
this appeal we have been ·obJiged to remain aware 
that. a summary judgment, which turns a party 
out of court without an opportunity to present 
his evidence, is a harsh mea;sure that should be 
granted only when, taking the view most favor-
able to a party's claims and any proof that might 
properly be adduced thereunder, he could in no 
event prevail. That both parties hereto make 
plausible arguments that the contract in question 
is so manifestly in their favor that reasonable 
minds could not see if the other way is a pointed 
commentary of the ability of the human mind to 
rationalize in its own interests. It is equally so 
upon the desirability and the propriety of resoJv-
ing any doubts in favor of permitting courts and 
juries t'O settle such disputes rather than ruling 
upon them summarily as was done here." 
The court further s.tated in the case of Samms v. 
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 Pac. 2d 344 at p. 355: 
"A motion for summary judgment is in effect 
a demurrer to the claims of the plaintiff, saying: 
assuming they are true, no right to recover is 
shown. It is regarded as a harsh measure which 
the courts .are reluctant to sanction because it 
deprives the adverse party of an opportunity 
to present the evidence concerning her grievance 
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for adjudication. For this reason plaintiff's oon-
t('ntions must be considered in the light most to 
her advantage and all doubts resolved in favor 
of permitting her to go to trial; and only if when 
the whole matter is so viewed, she could, neverthe-
lP~s, establish no right to recovery, should the 
motion be granted." 
In another Utah case, Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 
1 ~:1 Utah 289, 259 Pac. 297 the Supreme affirmed a sum-
mary judgment; however at page 299 the Court stated: 
"Although we are sensitive of the duty of 
courts to safeguard the right of citizens to have 
grievances fully tried on the merits to courts and 
juries under proper circumstances, this does not 
lead to the necessity or desirability of such sub-
mission where, taking the evidence and all fair 
inferences therefrom most favorable to a plaintiff, 
all reasonable minds must yet conclude that his 
own lack of due care proximately contributed to 
cause his injury.'' 
That this is the general law is further supported in 
-n Am. Jur. Sec. 342 at p. 525. 
"If there are issues of fact, the motion f'or 
Slunmary judgement is denied, or, in some juris-
dictions, the issues are narrowed to the material 
facts which are actually .and in good faith contro-
verted. If there are no questions of fact, the 
judge applies the law in accordance with the ad-
Initted facts as disclosed by the affidavits. The 
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sit~:mtion corresponds to that of a judge directing 
a Jury to render a verdict on admitted facts in 
the plaintiff's favor. 
"·These affidavits stand on a different foot-
ing than those in which the trial judge is deter-
mining a question of fact on affidavits. If the 
affidavit of defense shows a substantial issue of 
fact, summary judgment should not be ordered 
even though the affidavit is disbelieved. If the 
affidavits on the one side and on the other are 
directly opposed as to the facts shown, the case 
must go to trial. Oral evidence is not admissible, 
nor are interrogatories propounded for the pur-
pose of discovery, where the statutes or rules 
under which they are propounded do not contem-
plate their use." 
Applying these basic principles of law to the instant 
case the pleadings clearly show material issues exist. 
First, there is a dispute as to the allocation of funds ob-
tained from the return of merchandise inventory and 
collected accounts receivable. The plaintiff contends that 
the inventory may be prorated between the balance owing 
on the note and the balance on the open account. The de-
fendants aU contend that all of the accounts receivable 
and all of the inventory returned must be applied to 
the note as is clearly set forth in the agreement of March 
10, 19'61. 
Secondly, the plaintiff and defendants take opposite 
positions as to the purpose of the assignment which was 
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PXP<·uted .March 10, 1961. The plaintiff's complaint al-
leges Inerely t; 111 t the assignment was executed on March 
10, 1 ~)(; t and are entitled to judgment on the assignment. 
The defendants, however, in their answer and in the 
t•otmtPr affidavit opposing the motion for summary 
judgment specifically allege that no consideration was 
givPn for the assignment and that the only purp·ose for 
the assign1nent was f.or security purposes. The assign-
ment was to secure the promissory note dated March 
l 0, 1961. It is apparent that this difference of opinion 
cannot be resolved from the pleadings alone. It would 
be necesS'ary to have testimony taken in order to deter-
mine what was the .actual intent and purpose of the 
assignment. 
Thirdly, there is a material issue with reference to 
,,·hat, if any, attorney's fees should be granted to the 
plaintiff and charged against the defendant corporation. 
Paragraph 10 of the plaintiff's affidavit supporting 
his motion for summary judgment alleges that reason-
able attorney's fees are: "$4700.00 appHcahle to the note 
and $3500.00 applicable to the chattel mortgage." The 
defendants, in paragraph 7 of their counter affidavit, 
eon tended it is not possible to have .attorney's fees assess-
ed both on the promissory note and a second attorney's 
fee on the chattel mortgage which secures the note. This 
eertainly would be a duplication of attorney''s fees. De-
spite this dispute as to assessment of attorney fees, the 
Court awarded an attorney fee of $4500.00 and in no 
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way indicated whether it was based upon the: note, the 
chattel mortgage, or both. With reference to attorney 
fees it is further alleged by the defendants that by proper 
application of the: eredits the notes might very well be 
satisfied, in which event no attorney fees could be assess~ 
ed. Therefore, it is apparent that the Court must make 
a distinction as to moneys owed on the note and moneys 
owed on the open account before attorney fees can he 
assessed. The lower court apparently ignored this im-
portant distinction. 
Fourth, a supplemental agreement dated March 
10, 1961, was not mBJde part of the pleadings by the 
plaintiff. The defendants have argued that all of the 
documents must he before the court in order to have a 
full understanding of the case. The defendants in their 
answer and their counterclaim have alleged the existence 
and importance o.f the SuppJemental Agreement which 
is an integral part o.f the Agreement iitself. Paragraph 
2 of the supplemental agreement states: "Payments to 
Acme on said assigned account shall be applied to the 
oldest item or charge on the account." The defendants 
contend that all of the assigned accounts receivable ap-
ply to the note and carry out the general intent of the 
parties that the note was to be liquidated as rapidly as 
possible. To some extent, the plaintiff must agree with 
this position because in their pleadings they allege that 
all of the accounts re:ceivable collected were credited to 
the note. Enlarging upon this intent, it becomes increas-
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ingly apparent that it was the desire of he parties to pro-
vide as much security as possible on the note obligation. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THAT THE COURT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED 
THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS BY PRORATING INVENTORY 
ITEMS BETWEEN THE OPEN A:CCOUNT AND THE 
NOTE AND BY GRANTING A JUDGMENT WHICH MADE 
NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NOTE AND THE OPEN 
ACCOUNT. 
The judgment against the personal defendants in the 
Sillll of $21,979.73 was granted on the assignment and 
\ras not considered by the Court as security on the note. 
A judgment ·of $19,005.73 was against the corporation 
only and made no distinction as to whether it applied 
to the note or the open account. The interest in the sum 
of $960 and the attorney's fee of $4500 were judgments 
against the corporation only but it is not !lmown whether 
the interest or attorney fees were based on the note or 
the open account In determining what was intended by 
the parties it is necessary to construe all of the instru-
ments together, one of which was not included in p1ain-
tiff's complaint. The basic agreement is the document 
entitled "Agreeement" and dated March 10, 1961 and this 
document clearly spells out the intent of the parties in 
that Paragraph 2 provides : 
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"To secure the payment of said promissory 
note .Acme agrees : (a) to execute and deliver 
to Mastic a chattel mortgage . . . (b) to se:ll, 
assign, and transfer to Mastic all its accounts 
receivable ... " 
Then referring to Paragraph 4 the agreement 
states: 
""From and after the 1st day of January, 
1961, .all purchases from Mastic by Acme shall be 
at 2% discount if paid within 60 days from the 
invoice date and net if paid thereafter provided 
that all payments to Mastic shall be the net in-
voice amount and if paid within the discount 
period Mastic agrees to credit the discount to 
the unpaid balance of the promissory note men-
tioned above provided further that all invoices 
shall be paid not later than 75 days from invoice 
date." 
It is apparent from these two provisions of the 
agreeement that the note was to be fully secured and paid 
off as rapidly as possible pursuant to the terms of the 
agreement and that the open account was to be kept 
current at all times thus preventing the building up of 
a large open account which had created the trouble in the 
beginning. Therefore, at the time of the execution of 
the agreement the old open account was reduced to a 
promissory note and there was no other indebtedness 
owing by the defendant corporation to the plaintiff. 
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The assignment, dated March 10, 1961, provide in 
the last paragraph : 
"It is agreed by Acme Distributing Company, 
Inc. and Mastic Tile Division of Rubberoid Com-
pany, assignor and assignee, respectively, that 
this assignment shall be a part of that certain 
agreement between them, dated March 10, 19·61." 
It is obvious that at the time this assignment was 
executed the only outstanding obligation was the note ; 
therefore it must necessarily indicate that the intent of 
the parties was to protect the plaintiff against the possi-
bility of los·s on the note, there being no other obligation 
in existance at that time to which the assignment could 
apply. This is especially true when no consideration was 
given for the assignment. 
The supplemental agreement dated March 10, 1961, 
in Paragraph 2 states : 
"Payments to Acme on said assigned ac-
count shall he applied to the oldest item or charge 
on the account." 
The agreement provides that the receivable shall be 
assigned as security to the promissory note. Therefore, 
it is logical and certainly the intent of the party that the 
funds from the assigned receivables are to be applied to-
"~ard the payment of the note. If the assigned accounts 
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receivable were to be used in the payment and liquida-
tion of the open account, this in effect would destroy the 
very purpose of the original assignment which was to 
secure the note itself. The reading of the documents to-
gether conclusively points out that it was the plaintiff's 
intent to compel the liquidation of the old account hy 
paying off a promissory note at the rate of $2000 per 
month. The open account, in order to be kept current, 
must be paid not only from the revenues derived from 
the sale of the plaintiff's products but also from the 
revenues derived generally from all sales. Certainly no 
one can contend that the sale of the plaintiff's products 
alone would give sufficient profit to both liquidate the 
note and the open account. 
The agreement provides that in the event of default 
on the payments on the note, there can be foreclosure 
proceedings against the security. Rather than have a 
foreclosure through the Court, the inventory and the 
accounts receiv~ble were returned to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff did apply all of the proceeds from the accounts 
receivable that had been collected to the note. How-
eveT, the plaintiff prorated the returned inventory he-
tween the balance of $47,250.00 on the note and the $35,-
020.49 on the open account. The affidavit suppo·rting the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment clearly sets 
out this proration accounting. It is contrary to the pro-
visions of the agreement which was prepared by the 
plaintiff and signed by the defendants. It is apparent 
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that the basic reason for the proration in violation of 
the agreement was to leave a large balance still owing 
on the note which could then be liquidated by funds ob-
tained from the assignment, and in this way compel 
personal liability. All of the inventory credits and all 
of the accotmts receivable credits should have been ap-
plied to the promissory note pursuant to the agreement. 
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts this would have 
resulted in reducing the balance on the note from $47,250 
to $6,312.22. Therefore, by proper construction of the 
instruments there could have been no gre·ater personal 
liability on the .assignment than $6,312.22 plus costs and 
attorney fees as provided by the note. However, it must 
be kept in mind that at the time the action was com-
menced, there was still approximately $7,353.54 in as-
signed accounts receivable not yet collected. If this 
amount had been collected in full, the note would have 
been fully satisfied. In such an event there would have 
been no personal liability whatsoever. 
The only other instrument of significance is the Ex-
tension and Modification Agreement dated December 20, 
1961. Paragraph 1 of that instrument indicates that the 
note had been reduced to $55,500.00. Because of the re-
duction of the balance, the monthly payments and inter-
est rates were reduced. However, to further protect 
the obligation of the note, Paragraph 4 provided that 
sales rebates which had heretofore been applied to the 
note would in the future be credited against the open 
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account to prevent the open account from getting too 
large. This modification in itself hears out the intent 
of the parties in fully securing a note in the first in-
stance, .and that there was originally no intent to secure 
in any fashion the open account. It was only when the 
open account began increasing in size that steps were 
taken to in some way prevent the recurrance of another 
huge indebtedness. 
Considering all of these instruments together in the 
light of the original intent of the parties the Court was 
in error in prorating the inventory against the balance 
owing on the open account as well as the note. The court 
should have followed the instruments of the parties and 
applied all of the merchandise returned to the note. Pol-
lowing this construction of the instruments, the findings 
of attorney fees, interest, and personal liability would 
have been substantially different. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW ERRED IN NOT 
FINDING THAT AT THE TIME THE ASSIGNMENT WAS 
EXECUTED, MARCH 10, 1961, IT WAS FOR SECURITY 
PURPOSES ONLY. 
The only existing debt between the plaintiff Mastic 
Tile and the defendant Acme Distributing Company, Inc., 
at the time of the March 10 agreement was the $81,278.91 
open account which was reduced to the promissory note. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
This debt had arisen as a result of past purchases on open 
account. No further loan was extended to the defendant 
at the time of the note. It was contemplated that further 
pnrelta:sPs would be made on open account but that the 
have plaintiff did not want the accounts to raise above a 
nominal level and prolong or increase the insecure finan-
eial position of the defendant, Acme Corporation. It was 
possible at the time of the agreement that Acme may 
never have incurred further debts on open account. The 
plaintiff contends that there was a general assignment 
of the W. N. Beesley, Jr. obligation. If there were a 
general assignment of that obligation, the plaintiff would 
have the legal right to coUect the full value of the assign-
ment from W. N. Beesley, Jr., W. N. Beesley, Sr., and 
Scott L. Beesley regardless of any other agreement the 
parties may have entered into This would give the 
plaintiff the right to collect $21,979.73 on the assignment. 
·rhis right wo-uld exist in addition to and regardless of 
any other right to collect on the note. The plaintiff had 
the right to collect on the note whether or not there was 
an assignment and whether the assignment was general 
or merely as security. No one disputes the $81,278.91 in-
dt'btedness; however, if the assignment is to be consid-
ered general in character and given for good and valu-
able consideration, and the note also considered valid 
as the plaintiff contends, the plaintiff would have the 
legal zh}. to f.<i}ect not only the $81,278.91 hut the addi-
tional $~~,.9i making a total of 103,259.64. It is incon-
ceivable that individuals, ·whether they be officers or 
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not, would place themselves in the unprotected position 
of making themselves personally liable by an outright 
grant of $21,979.73 whether the note was paid or not. 
The plaintiff contends that there was consideration 
paid for the assignment. This would require testimony 
because the pleadings of the plaintiff do not, in any 
way, indicate what if any consideration was given. On 
the other hand, the defendants repeatedly contended 
that the assignment was for security only and that the 
personal defendants did not intend to hold themselves 
out for personal liability on an unlimited basis. The de-
fendants should have a right in Court to present their 
position. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT AS A MAT'TER OF LAW ERRED IN 
GRANTING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DE-
FENDANTS, W. N. BEESLEY, SR. AND SCOTT L. BEES-
LEY, BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS CLEARLY ESTABLISH 
THAT BY PROPER APPLICATION OF MONEYS RECEIVED, 
THE NOTE SE'CURED BY THE PERSONAL ASSIGNMENT 
WAS LIQUIDA'TED THEREBY RELIEVING PERSONAL 
DEFENDANTS OF FURTHER LIABILITY, SINCE THE 
ASSIGNMENT WAS MADE AS SECURITY FOR THE DEBT 
WHICH EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE ASSIGNMENT 
AND NOT FOR FUTURE DEBTS. 
At the time of the assignment of the defendant, Acme 
Distributing Company, Inc., was in serious financial 
trouble, and the defendants contended that the debts 
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Pxi~·ding at the time should be consolidated into one note 
and that the note should be secured by the assignment as 
well as the accounts receivable and chattel mortgage. It 
was not the intent of the parties that there should he a 
substantial future additional extension of credit. In f.aet, 
the docurnents indicated there was not to be any type of 
~ubstnntial extension of lines of credit but that the open 
accotmt was to be :kept current at all times. Therefore, 
there was no need to apply the assignment as security 
for any future debts between the defendant and the 
plaintiff. If the assignments were to apply to future 
debts or some other obligation than the note, then the 
agreement must specifically so state. The Colorado 
Supreme Oourt in expressing the general rule on this 
subject stated in Horton v. McFerson, 30 Pae. 2d, 256 
~1-1- Colo. 361, at p. 258 : 
" ... a pledge to secure a specific debt cannot 
be held by the pledgee as security for any other 
obligation, except by express agreement between 
the pledgor and pledgee." 
The intention of the parties in this situation was 
that the assignment was only for the note and not for 
future debts. Even if the parties had intended that the 
assignment was for the future open account indebtedness 
which may or may not have arisen, the pledge for the 
future accounts would have been ineffective because it 
was not expressly included in the assignment. This rule 
is based on sound reasoning. A pledge in the hands of a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
pledgee remains the property of the pledgor and he has 
the right to decide how the propeTty should he disposed 
of subject to the limited rights of the pJedgee. It is 
presumed that the pledgor did not intend to give away 
any rights in the property which he did not do so ex-
pressly. 
The intention of the parties being to liquidate the 
note and to absolutely prevent any future obJigation in 
accumulating, it is inconceivable that the assignment 
could have been for a future debt which they were at-
tempting to avoid in every way possible. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is submitted: 
1. ·The Trial Court has erred in granting a sum-
mary judgment in that there are material issues of law 
and fact which may be resolved only by the Oourt hearing 
testimony. 
2. ~The ruling of the Court in allowing a proration of 
inventory credits between the open account and the note 
is contrary to the instrument itself. 
3. The documents themselves clearly establish the 
intent of the parties to liquidate the existing obligation 
and to prevent future indebtedness. 
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+. The assignment was for security purposes only 
and the personal liability was limited to securing a 
promissory note to the extent of the assignment. Upon 
the payment of the note, the security in the form of the 
assignment was discharged or should have been dis-
charged. 
THEREFORE, the summary judgment should be 
reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court 
for a trial on its merits. 
B~spectfully submitted, 
BE.ASLIN, NYGAARD & COKE 
By HENRY S. NYGAARD 
Attorneys for Defenda;n.ts-
Appella!nts 
513 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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